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APOLOGY AND THICK TRUST: WHAT SPOUSE ABUSERS
AND NEGLIGENT DOCTORS MIGHT HAVE IN COMMON
ERIN ANN O'HARA*
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars are paying increasing attention to the relationship
between apology and legal disputes. Common legal analysis focuses
on formal legal disputes and their resolution. Consequentialist schol-
ars focus on how the legal rules applied to resolve disputes affect the
way that actors behave, while others focus on using legal rules to
promote procedurally and substantively just outcomes. Apology
forms a very interesting link between ex ante behavioral incentives
and ex post legal disputes and their resolution. Put differently, many
legal disputes only come forward in the absence of an apology, and
apologies are now commonly thought to substitute for at least partial
compensation. Why do injured victims feel so strongly about receiv-
ing an apology? And why are they sometimes quite quick to forgive
wrongdoers after a simple heartfelt apology? Why are apologies so
universally administered, and what social function do they serve?
These questions are beginning to be explored by legal and other
apology scholars.'
When a widespread behavioral phenomenon is observed, behav-
ioral biologists and evolutionary psychologists use evolutionary the-
ory to attempt to understand why the behavior might have been
adaptive in the environments in which we evolved. An understanding
of the situations in which the behavior might be adaptive can help us
to understand both (1) the contexts in which we are likely to observe
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Special thanks to Claire Hill, James
Blumstein, Oliver Goodenough, David Hyman, Owen Jones. Jeffrey Shoenblum, Charlie Silver,
and Michael Vandenbergh, and to participants at the Chicago-Kent College of Law symposium,
for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank Julie Reed for valuable research assistance.
This project was supported by a research grant from Vanderbilt Law School.
1. In addition to the sources cited infra, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to
Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1109 (1999); Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997); Lee Taft. Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology,
109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000); Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies
Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289 (2)01).
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relatively more (or less) of the behavior, and (2) our need to attempt
to discourage behaviors that have evolutionary origins but are no
longer adaptive. The first use of evolutionary theory is positive and
predictive, while the latter is normative. This Article attempts to util-
ize evolutionary theory for both purposes: to further our understand-
ing of the evolutionary function of apology and to identify modern
contexts in which victims are overinclined to forgive wrongdoers. The
Article uses evolutionary theory to argue that victims of both spouse
abuse and physician negligence are among those who are overinclined
to forgive.
If substantive justice cannot be achieved without providing a le-
gal remedy to those wronged, then excessive forgiveness can circum-
vent those legal mechanisms in potentially problematic ways.
Moreover, to the extent that we count on legal liability to ensure op-
timal behaviors, we might worry about the ways in which wrongdoer
apologies can dampen those incentives. For these reasons, the apol-
ogy link is worth exploring, and evolutionary theory can help lawyers
to better understand the role of the apology link in the chains of effi-
ciency and justice. Part I of this Article briefly explores the connec-
tion between apology and forgiveness and evolutionary theory, and
Part II offers some initial thoughts about the ways in which the law
can help overcome excessive forgiveness.
I. VICTIM EMOTIONS FROM AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Much of contemporary legal analysis now at least implicitly rests
on an economic model of behavior. 2 The rational actor model proba-
bly has more explanatory and predictive powers than any competitor
models of human behavior. It has severe limits in the context of suit
and settlement decisions, however, because disputes and their resolu-
tion are often profoundly influenced by emotional considerations. No
economist would deny the presence or importance of human emo-
tions, but their amorphous, unquantifiable nature makes them diffi-
cult to incorporate into mathematical models. Disputants' emotions
are left for psychologists to ponder, while the economists generate
suit and settlement models based on tried and true "expected value"
principles. Unfortunately, these models often prove both descrip-
2. See Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloud), Future, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (1997) ("The analysis of most private law subjects is so heavily
influenced by economic thought that it is difficult to think of how a scholar of torts, contracts,
corporations, or restitution could proceed in ignorance of the basic principles of the area.").
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tively and predictively quite weak. The point here is not that dispute
resolution is completely uninformed by an economic framework, but
rather that the economic framework often cannot be successfully util-
ized in the area of dispute resolution without a more careful specifica-
tion of disputants' emotion-driven preferences than economists are
typically comfortable generating.
Psychology can help to identify and explain victim emotions and
the cognitive biases that victims manifest. Because both emotions and
cognitive biases can conflict with one another, however, strong theo-
retical underpinnings of these emotions must be identified in order to
better understand which psychological phenomena are likely to influ-
ence behavior in given conflict settings. Behavioral biology is devel-
oping to the point where it can help to provide this theoretical basis
on which to proceed. This Part builds on my previous effort to draw a
connection between behavioral biology and apology, 3 and it proceeds
to explore situations where victims can forgive too easily. This intro-
duction provides a brief description of the ideas underlying behav-
ioral biology.
To a natural scientist, the economists' failure to capture and
therefore predict dispute resolution behaviors stems at least in part
from a misunderstanding of the human brain. The brain, like the rest
of our physical anatomy, is subject to evolutionary pressures over
time.4 Natural and sexual selection work across generations to in-
crease the frequency of those heritable traits that tend to increase
reproductive success relative to other traits.5 These evolutionary pres-
sures are not forward looking. Rather, traits that are adaptive in the
environment where the brain develops become increasingly common
in each generation where that environment persists. If the environ-
ment changes, creating new selection pressures, it can take many gen-
erations before the old selected trait is replaced by a new one.6 Our
very basic brain functions are millions of years old, and those brain
3. Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV.
1121 (2002).
4. See Owen D. Jones, Law and Behavioral Biology (Oct. 27. 2003) (unpublished manu-
script at 5, on file with author, forthcoming in MICH. L. REV.): Owen D. Jones. Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 1141. 1164-68 (2001) [hereinafter Time-Shifted Rationalit.,].
5. Jones. Law and Behavioral Biology, supra note 4 (manuscript at 20 & n.27); see gener-
ally JOHN ALCOCK. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998);
TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE (2001).
6. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationalit,, supra note 4, at 1167-68.
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functions that are uniquely human are thousands of years old.7 Any
valid model of human behavior must therefore take into account
emotions, cognitive thought processes, and behavioral tendencies that
would have been adaptive, on average, in this environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation, or "EEA.''
Central to biological theory is the proposition that reproductively
successful humans maximize genetic utility rather than the econo-
mists' individual utility:
To the extent that people and other animals often behave as if they
were rational maximizers of individual utility, it is partly because
their information processing pathways have been honed by natural
selection, the most relentlessly economizing force in the history of
life, and partly because maximizing individual utility is often
epiphenomenal to maximizing genetic utility.9
To the extent that individual and genetic utility diverge, how-
ever, biological theory predicts that we are more likely to see behav-
iors that enhance or maximize genetic utility. Moreover, we are more
likely to see individuals exhibiting predispositions toward behaviors
that were adaptive in the EEA than we are to see behaviors that are
fitness or utility enhancing today.
Insights from evolutionary theory can be used to help understand
some of the emotions bound up in disputes and their resolution. From
a game theoretic perspective, moralistic aggression deters defections,
but the punishment costs of defection can be minimized through
apology and forgiveness. Apologies are often incredibly powerful and
emotionally quite valuable to victims. In fact, I will suggest here that
the effects of apology on victims are too powerful in some contexts.
Put simply, victims of some transgressions too often forgive their
wrongdoers in ways that either harm the victims or create risks of
harm to others. In these contexts, private law alone cannot function
efficiently. Here I briefly discuss the two most prominent examples -
spouse abuser and doctor apologies-and suggest that evolutionary
theory might help us understand why apologies can be problematic in
these particular contexts.
7. See RICHARD WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES: APES AND THE
ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 43, 227 (1996) (Homo sapiens is only about 150,000 to 230,000
years old while the start of the genus Homo was 2 to 2.5 million years ago).
8. Jones, Law and Behavioral Biology, supra note 4 (manuscript at 22); see generally Leda
Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason?
Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187, 189 (1989).
9. Jones, Law and Behavioral Biology, supra note 4 (manuscript at 21).
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Before proceeding with the analysis, however, a few caveats
about the behavioral biological approach are in order. First, evolu-
tionary biologists concern themselves with "ultimate" rather than
"proximate" causes of emotions, cognitive processes, and behavior.1 0
For biologists, the proximate causes of these phenomena explain how
they manifest themselves, whereas the ultimate causes of these phe-
nomena explain why they are observed." For example, the proximate
causes of sexual jealousy include observing a sex partner with an
attractive potential mate as well as the neurochemical reactions in the
brain that generate heightened attention, fear, lowered self-
confidence, etc. The ultimate causes of sexual jealousy, by contrast,
focus on the reasons humans experience this jealousy. Humans ex-
perience sexual jealousy to prepare themselves to respond to threats
against their abilities to sexually monopolize their mates. Humans
who experience this jealousy (at least in moderate doses) are likely
more reproductively successful than those who do not. Nothing in
behavioral biological theory requires that a sexually jealous person be
aware of the ultimate cause of his behavior. Indeed, he need not be
consciously interested in sexual reproduction as a goal. For biologists,
it only matters that the phenomenon-here sexual jealousy-in fact
serves the function-here relative reproductive success. 2
As Owen Jones notes:
[U]litimate causation analysis will be more useful in some contexts
than in others. In many cases, we may feel that our existing under-
standing of a phenomenon, even if that understanding extends only
to proximate causes, is sufficient for our purposes. But often, when
we are puzzled about human behavior, an inquiry into ultimate
causation will prove a useful complement to existing efforts to
understand and predict the behavior. 13
10. For a discussion of the distinction between proximate and ultimate causation in biol-
ogy, see TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING
LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 6-10 (1991).
1I. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality. supra note 4, at 1161-63.
12. In this sense, biological theory is similar to economic theory. Economic theory assumes
that individuals engage in productive activities in order to maximize their profits. It may be the
case that a baker loves to make pies and opens a bakery to enjoy the satisfaction of making pies
all day. He may care not a whit about whether his baking generates a profit. If he does generate
a profit, however, he is more likely to be able to continue to enjoy making pies all day. Over
time, those bakers who fail to generate profits are driven out of business. The profits may not
consciously motivate this particular baker, but they are a necessary prerequisite to continuing
his operations. The behavioral assumption that his actions are motivated to generate profits is
therefore descriptively useful despite his conscious decision making.
13. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 4, at 1164.
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Second, behavioral biology predicts that humans will be predis-
posed toward certain cognitive processes, emotions and behaviors.
These predispositions have the effect of biasing behavioral patterns,
but they do not determine the behavior of any particular individual.
1 4
The greater the selection pressure on a given behavioral response to a
particular context, the more strongly the behavioral response is pre-
dicted.15 For example, most humans who have not consumed food for
more than a few hours will begin to focus their energies on obtaining
food to consume. Failure to consume food for too long leads to death,
so we can assume hunger is a fairly useful drive. Although I will argue
that evolutionary theory provides useful insights into the phenomena
of apology and forgiveness, predispositions toward apology and for-
giveness are likely less universal and less likely to produce those
behaviors than is the predisposition to search for food when hungry.
Third, some of the phenomena discussed in this Article are sub-
ject to considerable individual and cultural variation. Apology and
forgiveness come easily for some and are difficult for others.1 6 Some
cultures promote apologetic behaviors and encourage forgiveness to
try to strengthen the behavioral predispositions. 7 However, the fact
that culture plays an important role in some of these phenomena does
not contradict a biological explanation. The old nature-nurture di-
chotomy is now widely understood to be false.18 Both nature and nur-
ture play a vital role in virtually all behaviors. Some genes fail to
express themselves without a facilitative environment, and many of
our cultural practices are chosen to strengthen (or weaken) our ge-
netic predispositions. 9 Biological theory, however, can tell us some-
thing about the marginal influence of proposed cultural practices on
14. Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2091-92 (2000) (book review).
15. Cf Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 4, at 1191-92 (arguing that law will have
relatively small marginal effects on behavior as its adaptive value in the EEA rises).
16. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis Into
Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221 (1999) (exploring
gender differences surrounding apology and their policy implications).
17. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and
Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461 (1986) (contrasting Japanese
and American uses of apology).
18. See MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, AND WHAT
MAKES US HUMAN 3 (2003) ("For more than 50 years sane voices have called for an end to the
debate. Nature versus nurture has been declared everything from dead and finished to futile and
wrong-a false dichotomy.").
19. See id. at 6 (describing genes as "both cause and consequence of our actions").
[Vol 79:1055
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behavioral predispositions. A ban on romantic expression is much less
likely to be successful than a ban on purple shoes, for example.
Are there evolutionary functions served by apology, forgiveness
and victim emotions? Section A of this Part situates these phenomena
in a simple game theoretic framework. Section B discusses the strate-
gic use of apology, and Section C identifies circumstances in which
victims may be apt to forgive too easily. Part II will discuss the impli-
cations of the analysis for legal efforts to regulate harmful behaviors.
A. Apology and Forgiveness Economize on Punishment Costs
The analysis begins where most elementary game theoretic
analyses begin-with the Prisoner's Dilemma. 0 The basic insight un-
derlying the Prisoner's Dilemma, which is ubiquitous in legal prob-
lems, is that selfish individuals can have difficulty precommitting
themselves to cooperate. Cooperation makes people better off, but
individuals are often tempted to enjoy the benefits of others' helpful
acts while cheating with one's own efforts. Reputation, iterative plays,
and legal sanctions all help to bolster cooperative behavior, and often
the players themselves can employ mechanisms to discourage cheat-
ing. Nevertheless, defection often remains a possibility.
Evolutionary theory can help to elucidate some common human
preferences and behaviors related to cooperation and defections.
Unlike the completely individualistic Homo economicus, the proto-
typical human in evolutionary theory is seeped in social relationships.
Anthropologists have found no evidence of humans living in isola-
tion.21 Indeed, it is not at all clear that humans could survive without
the cooperation of others to hunt, rear offspring, and protect against
animal and human predators. It therefore makes sense that some of
our evolved cognitive mechanisms and emotions would work to elicit
cooperation and discourage defections in others. After all, individuals
who were successful at eliciting cooperation from others presumably
were more likely to survive, thrive, and rear offspring.
Moreover, it seems likely that certain evolved human predisposi-
tions help us to reap the benefits of cooperation. All of the primates,
20. For a basic treatment of the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm, see ROBERT AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-35 (1984); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 27-30 (1989).
21. PAUL H. RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF FREEDOM 7(2002) (stating that "[hiominids. . . have always been social creatures").
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including humans, have affiliative tendencies. We all have the capac-
ity to remember our previous interactions and to communicate our
desires for help. Humans form friendships, families, coalitions, busi-
ness partnerships, and societies. Furthermore, we seem to possess an
optimism bias that in the right contexts allows us to trustingly take the
initial step toward forming these relationships and cooperating with
one another.22
Because this cooperation is exploitable, however, humans simul-
taneously evolved brain mechanisms to both keep track of trade and
detect cheating. Moreover, Leda Cosmides, an evolutionary psy-
chologist, has demonstrated that people are remarkably good at de-
tecting cheating behavior by others.23 Other studies indicate that
people are significantly better than chance at detecting defection.
24
The two brain mechanisms work together to enable humans to
remain vigilant about the possibility of defection. Awareness of cheat-
ing is not alone enough to discourage defections, though, so alongside
these brain mechanisms we developed an emotional precommitment
to punish perceived defections. Experimental subjects have consis-
tently exhibited a willingness to incur real costs to punish those who
defect, free ride, or behave unfairly.25
Evolutionary theorists are not surprised to hear that humans
take a punitive stance toward cheating. John Maynard Smith, a ge-
neticist, created a game between passive cooperators, or Doves, and
22. Karen S. Cook & Robin M. Cooper, Experimental Studies of Cooperation, Trust, and
Social Exchange, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 209, 227-31 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2003) (discuss-
ing social contexts in which trust and reciprocity are facilitated).
23. Cosmides, supra note 8.
24. See generally Bella M. DePaulo et al., Humans as Lie Detectors, 3(0 J. COMM. 129
(1980); Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, 14
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1981); Linda Mealey et al., Enhanced
Memory for Faces of Cheaters. 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 119 (1996).
25. See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum
Games, 25 INT7L J. GAMETHEORY 289, 300 (1996) (finding subjects willing to give up profits to
punish those who take too large a share of the total dollar amount to be distributed); see also
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gfichter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2(100) (finding that subjects heavily punished free riders in public goods
experiments). Apparently, female capuchin monkeys react negatively to their perceptions of
unfair treatment as well. A recent article in the journal Nature describes a study where female
capuchins initially were willing to perform trades with experimenters in return for cucumbers,
but when they saw that other capuchins were receiving higher-valued grapes for the same trade,
cooperation rates by capuchins receiving cucumbers fell to sixty percent. Nicholas Wade, Ge-
netic Basis to Fairness, Stud), Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at A-27. Actually, 'Jin the
original paper, the term 'dove' was changed at the last minute to 'mouse' in deference to
George Price's religious sensibilities." MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN
INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 271 n.6 (1997).
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aggressive defectors, or Hawks, to illustrate how cooperation,
defection, and punishment coevolve.26 When a Hawk encounters a
Dove, the former easily defeats the latter. When two Hawks encoun-
ter one another, they are both badly wounded. When two Doves en-
counter one another, however, they both receive benefits. Natural
selection, Smith argued, should result in an evolutionarily stable
strategy, one in which no animal using the strategy could be made
better off by following a different strategy.27 When the game is played
repeatedly, the Hawks initially thrive at the expense of the Doves.
Eventually the population of Doves decreases, however, and the
Hawk population begins to decline as Hawks mostly encounter one
another. A successful strategy is one in which Doves act like Doves
when they encounter other Doves but switch to Hawk behavior by
retaliating when they encounter Hawks. 2
The emotional urge to retaliate, which has been labeled "moral-
istic aggression" by biologists,29 is often quite powerful.30 Moralistic
aggression by victims involves feelings of anger, an emotion that has
the effect of providing the motivation to follow through on spiteful
urges.31 Feelings of anger are triggered when one perceives that her
goals have been thwarted by another's blameworthy actions,32 and
they serve to bias her attention to the situation that has elicited the
26. J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, NATURE, Nov. 2, 1973,
at 15.
27. J. Maynard Smith, Optimization Theory in Evolution, 9 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 31 (1978). The evolutionarily stable strategy is similar to the Nash equilibrium,
which is achieved when each player's individual strategy is optimal given that the other players
use their own equilibrium strategies. John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS
MATHEMATICS 286 (1951).
28. This strategy is known in Axelrod's computer simulations as "tit-for-tat." AXELROD,
supra note 20.
29. E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 595, 609
(1997).
30. Moralistic aggression is not confined to humans, as illustrated by the interaction be-
tween three chimpanzees in a colony at the Arnhem Zoo in the Netherlands. Puist, a large adult
female, supported Luit, one of the dominant males, in chasing Nikkie, another male. Later,
when Nikkie behaved threateningly toward Puist. Puist held out her hand toward Luit in an
apparent request for return support. When Luit failed to assist Puist, she barked furiously while
chasing and then hitting Luit. FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX
AMONG APES 207 (1982); see also Frans B. M. de Waal, Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obliga-
tions Among Chimpanzees, 18 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 433 (1989).
31. See Timothy Ketelaar & Gerald L. Clore, Emotion and Reason: The Proximate Effects
and Ultimate Functions of Emotions, in COGNITIVE SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY
AND EMOTION 355, 369 (Gerald Matthews ed., 1997) (discussing anger as emotion that provides
the motivation to follow through on threats).
32. Id. at 367.
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emotion. 33 Anger also has the effect of simultaneously motivating us
to punish and of seriously dampening our receptivity to the costs of
punishment.34 Anger therefore works to bind us to the long-term
strategy of deterring defections rather than the short-term strategy of
avoiding punishment costs. 35 This interference with "rational thought"
tends to further our self interest because it helps us to retain our re-
sources and our social status within groups, and it helps the group to
prevent infiltration by Hawks.
Notice how the evolutionary theory complements and enriches
the economist's use of game theory. Economists predict that one de-
ters defections with punishment, and evolutionary theory provides a
methodologically consistent bridge between the economics and psy-
chological literatures by explaining why and how victim anger can
work to promote cooperation in a society. The evolutionary theory,
coupled with knowledge from psychology, also helps to explain how
victims precommit themselves to retaliate against defections.
The victim's precommitment strategy of revenge, if always acted
on, can prove unnecessarily costly, however, because not all defec-
tions entail threats to one's life, livelihood, or social status. People
defect for several different reasons, including accident, oversight,
misunderstanding, need, temptation, indifference, and just plain
meanness. Some defections warrant punishment, but others do not.
Moreover, threats to social status can be undone if the transgressor
recants his defection and/or the other members of society affirm the
victim's status by denouncing the transgressor's acts. Threats to mate-
rial resources can be reversed by restitution or reparation efforts. In
these circumstances, the material and psychological resources neces-
sary to retaliate are more appropriately rechanneled into alternative
productive activities.
Apology and forgiveness work together also to help temper the
costs of moralistic aggression. According to apology experts, an effec-
tive apology requires (1) identification of the wrongful act; (2) ex-
pression of remorse and regret for having committed the act; (3)
promise to forbear from committing the wrongful act in the future;
33. Id. at 387.
34. Cf. id. at 379 ("[TIhe unpleasantness and distress of not being angry is a cost against not
doing something about it (reacting only to immediate incentives). The way to turn off this un-
pleasantness is to seek retribution or restitution and to right the wrong.7).
35. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 83 (1988).
[Vol 79:1055
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and (4) offer of repair.36 Some of these elements can be implicit in an
apology, and a victim may ultimately forgive even without an apology
and/or without requiring the apologizing transgressor to actually pro-
ceed with reparations.31 In the face of a sincere and timely apology,
however, many victims find their anger dissipates quite rapidly.38
Moreover, some transgressors actually feel an urge to apologize to
their victims, even when they know that the apology can be used
against them.39
Effective apologies work in a wonderfully paradoxical way. By
embracing and then rejecting the wrong, a transgressor admits that he
has transgressed while simultaneously proclaiming that he is a coop-
erator.40 Apologies can be difficult, however, because they require a
type of self-humiliation. To be effective, the transgressor must place
himself in a morally inferior position vis-A-vis the transgressor in a
symbolic gesture that has the effect of reviving the victim's perception
of his own status. The greater the harm inflicted on the victim, the
more victims seem to demand apologies.41 At the same time, the
shame and humiliation felt by the transgressor in the apology process
likely increases with the severity of the harm inflicted. Often counter-
acting the shame and humiliation is a strong urge on the part of the
offender to try to ameliorate any harm that he has caused the victim,
and the greater the harm, the greater this offsetting urge.42 Heartfelt
apologies therefore can have the effect of restoring the victim's status,
36. O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 3, at 1132-39 (summarizing definitions of several apology
scholars as expressing four basic elements); see also Carrie J. Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal
Justice Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System,
20 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 337, 340-41 (2002) (stating that essential elements of apology include "(i)
an expression of remorse or regret, such as 'I'm sorry'; (ii) an overt acceptance of responsibility
for the harmful act; (iii) some type of offer of compensation, repair, or restitution: and (iv) a
promise to avoid such behavior in the future") (citing other apology scholars).
37. In fact, one of the powerful effects of apology is that it often turns a wrongful act into a
mere misfortune of life. Many victims seriously reduce their compensation demands or forgive
them altogether when they receive what they perceive to be a sincere apology. See Steven
Keeva, Does Law Mean Never Having to Say You're Sorry, A.B.A. J. Dec. 1999, at 64, 65 (esti-
mating that 30 percent of medical malpractice cases could be avoided with a simple apology);
Levi, supra note 1, at 1167 (stating that apology can often move parties closer together).
38. O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 3, at 1123-24.
39. Id.
40. See NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION 26 (1991) (discussing both apology and forgiveness as means of separating act
from nature of offender).
41. Petrucci, supra note 36, at 352.
42. Id. at 354 (citing empirical studies and stating that "Iwjith an increased sense of respon-
sibility and when the victim experiences serious consequences, offenders may be more
motivated to apologize to the victim").
20(A I
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and if accepted, the transgressor's status as well. But to restore the
status of the transgressor, the transgressor must first place himself in a
very vulnerable position and hope that the victim and/or third parties
show the mercy necessary to resurrect his status.4
3
This revival of the victim's status, coupled with at least an im-
plicit offer to repair and a promise to forbear from transgressions in
the future, signals to the victim, often subconsciously, that his anger is
no longer serving an important function. In short, apologies can have
the effect of removing the preexisting, present, and future threats to
the victim, making retaliation an unnecessary strategy. In these cases,
victim anger often dissipates and forgiveness, typically coupled with
reconciliation, 44 is successful. Forgiveness is an admittedly nebulous
concept, and scholars seem to have difficulty agreeing on a single
definition.45 For my purposes, forgiveness is the victim's overcoming
of those negative and hostile feelings that help to foster the urge for
further retaliation. 46 Individuals who develop the emotional frame-
43. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 40, at 18 ("[Wlhen we apologize ... we stand unarmed and
exposed, relying, in a manner of speaking, on our moral nakedness to set things right.").
44. Because forgiveness is a psychological event internal to the victim, it is technically
possible for forgiveness to occur without reconciliation. See Robert D. Enright & Bruce A.
Kittle, Forgiveness in Psychology and Law: The Meeting of Moral Development and Restorative
Justice, 27 FORDHAM .URB. L.J. 1621, 1623 (2000) (distinguishing forgiving from condoning,
forgetting and reconciling). Moreover, reconciliation need not always involve "a sincere and
honest conversation about lrgiveness." Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Is lThere a Place for For-
giveness in the Justice System?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1721, 1725 (2000). Because this Article
focuses on the means by which an offender can facilitate the victim's forgiveness, reconciliation
and forgiveness will often be used interchangeably.
45. See, e.g., Enright & Kittle, supra note 44, at 1622-23 ("People, upon rationally deter-
mining that they have been unfairly treated, forgive when they willfully abandon resentment
and related responses (to which they have a right), and endeavor to respond to the wrongdoer
based on the moral principle of beneficence, which may include compassion, unconditional
worth, generosity, and moral love." (quoting Joanna North, Wrongdoing and Forgiveness, 62
PHIL. 499 (1987))); Dennis M. Cariello, Forgiveness and the Criminal Law: Forgiveness Through
Medicinal Punishment, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1607, 1608 (2000) ("Forgiveness is the voluntary
cancellation of an obligation created by conduct, whether purposeful or negligent."); Worthing-
ton, supra note 44, at 1721 ("Forgiveness involves super-imposing emotions of empathy, com-
passion and other-oriented altruistic love (or even romantic love) on top of "hot" anger at the
transgression or "cold" unforgiveness emotions."); David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Crimi-
nal Justice System: If it Belongs, Then Why Is it So Hard to Find?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663
(2000) (adopting a definition from the unpublished work of Robert Enright: "willingness to
abandon one's right to resentment, negative judgement [sicl, and indifferent behavior toward
one who unjustly injures us").
46. Under this definition of forgiveness, a victim no longer desires that the transgressor be
punished out of a desire for revenge. It is possible, however, that a victim would nevertheless
think punishment is appropriate for rehabilitative, educational, or deterrent purposes. Alterna-
tively the victim could think that punishment is necessary in order for a transgressor to pay a
debt owed to society. Cf. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance
and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1603 (2000) (arguing that "victim's
torgiveness may have no bearing on society's demand for punishment" or victim's view of
JVol 79:1055
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work necessary for the effective use of apology and forgiveness are
thus placed at a competitive advantage relative to those individuals
who must incur the full costs of moralistic aggression.41
B. Strategic Apologies and the Role of Transgressor Emotions
Apology and forgiveness thus explained introduce a potential
tension in the evolutionary framework. After a transgression, both
victim and transgressor may prefer reconciliation to retaliation, but ex
ante the possibility of conciliation can erode the deterrent effect of
the threat to retaliate. A truly strategic person knows that he can get
away with defection with a simple apology.48 If victims feel compelled
to forgive in the face of apology, then forgiveness has the potential to
become maladaptive.
In fact, victims are often quite discriminating in their responses
to apology. The nuances of apology matter a great deal to a judgment
of the apology's sincerity a9 Victims scrutinize everything from context
to word choice and order, timing, elaborateness, eye contact, breath,
body posture, facial expressions, tone of voice, and pace of speech.50
In fact, where sincerity is important, written apologies alone are typi-
cally much less effective than face-to-face communication.S1 Simple
apologetic gestures may suffice for very slight harms, but a more
appropriateness of punishment); Cariello, supra note 45, at 1609 (arguing that although society
forgives, "medicinal punishment" may nevertheless be appropriate).
47. Non-human primates apparently possess a similar taste for post-conflict resolution. See
generall' Frans B. M. de Waal, Reconciliation Among Primates: A Review of Empirical
Evidence and Unresolved Issues, in PRIMATE SOCIAL CONFLICT II1 (William A. Mason & Sally
P. Mendoza eds., 1993); Frans B. M. de Waal & RenMei Ren, Comparison of the Reconciliation
Behavior of Stumptail and Rhesus Macaques, 78 ETHOLOGY 129 (1988); Frans B. M. de Waal &
Angeline van Roosmalen, Reconciliation and Consolation Among Chimpanzees. 5 BEHAV.
ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 55 (1979); Frans de Waal & D. Yoshihara, Reconciliation and
Redirected Affection in Rhesus Monkeys, 85 BEHAVIOR 224 (1983); Alison D. York & T. E.
Rowell, Reconciliation Following Aggression in Patas Monkeys, Erythocebus patas 36 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 502 (1988); Karolina Westlund et al., Post-Conflict Affiliation in Common Marmosets
(Callithrixjacchusjacchus), 52 AM. J. PRIMATOLOGY 31 (2000).
4& Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Keynote Address: Forgiveness.. Reconcilition and Responding to
Evil. A Philosophical Overview, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353, 1359 (2000) ("If I were going to
set out to oppress other people, I would surely prefer to select for my victims persons whose
first response is forgiveness rather than persons whose first response is revenge.").
49. 1 do not mean to claim that sincerity is always important to the formal acceptance of an
apology. Sometimes an insincere apology is valuable to the victim as an admission of guilt. That
admission is often very useful for convincing third parties that the victim was not at fault or that
the transgressor's actions should be more carefully scrutinized. The acceptance of the perceived
insincere apology is unlikely to result in subjective forgiveness, however.
50. O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 3, at 1139-40.
51. TAVUCHIS, supra note 40, at 22-24.
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complex apology is typically demanded for more severe harms.52 And
partial apologies, or apologies that do not accept blame, can actually
increase the victim's spiteful feelings.
53
In part, a sincere apology communicates that the transgressor
feels guilt, 54 a point that warrants some elaboration. Guilt serves an
important corrective function in humans. While people can and do
think about their long-term interests, it is well known that many ani-
mals, including humans, behave as though they heavily discount the
value of future rewards as compared to present ones.5 5 Long-term
relationship and reputational benefits are often larger than the short-
term benefits from cheating, but a person may nevertheless discount
those future benefits in favor of the present reward. In the EEA,
where the preservation of goods was difficult, this preference for pre-
sent consumption could be valuable at times.56 In the context of rela-
tionships, however, this preference for the present reward can be
destructive. Guilt in humans can thus be viewed as an evolved emo-
tional capacity that works to counteract the preference for present
rewards where they can be harmful. Rather than counting on a ra-
tional calculation to properly value the future consequences of a pre-
sent choice, feelings of guilt are evoked to help transform those future
costs into presently felt ones.57 At the moment of choice, guilt, where
effective, creates negative feelings that cause the decision maker to
avoid choosing the present reward.
In the context of an apology, the transgressor's guilty feelings
obviously failed to prevent the transgression. There are several possi-
52. Petrucci, supra note 36, at 352.
53. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examina-
tion, 102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (subjects in study were less inclined to settle when
offered a partial apology where the offender caused severe injury and where it was clear to the
victim that the offender's actions were blameworthy).
54. I distinguish between guilt and shame in the following way. Guilt has internal causes in
that it is experienced when one knows that he has committed, or is thinking of committing, a
transgression. Shame comes from knowing that another thinks one has committed or is contem-
plating committing a transgression. Under this distinction, guilt can exist without shame, for
example when one knows he has committed a transgression but believes no one else knows.
Shame can exist without guilt, for example when one knows that others falsely believe that he
committed a transgression.
55. FRANK, supra note 35, at 79-80 (discussing this psychological phenomenon as "the
matching law" and noting that similar decision making has been observed in pigeons, rats, cats,
dogs, guinea pigs, and hogs).
56. See Ketelaar & Clore, supra note 3t, at 372 (stating that preference for immediate over
future rewards may be adaptive to some extent); Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 4,
at 1179 ("[Alverage life expectancy has skyrocketed" and "high discount rates make sense when
life expectancy is short.").
57. FRANK, supra note 35, at 82.
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ble causes of this failure. The transgressor may not experience feel-
ings of guilt, at least not very often. To the extent that guilt precom-
mits us to be cooperators, "Hawks" are individuals who experience
guilt very infrequently or with very low intensity. But Doves, defined
as individuals who experience relatively high levels of guilt, are capa-
ble of transgressions too. If the harm was caused by mere inadver-
tence, for example, the transgressor likely did not focus enough on
the possible harm for guilty feelings to be evoked. Sometimes other
powerful emotions or drives such as rage or lust or hunger work to
cancel out the guilt feelings that would otherwise be present. Alterna-
tively, the transgressor might have felt guilt at the moment of decid-
ing to transgress but the guilt feelings were insufficient to overcome
the very large present rewards. Dove transgressors sort themselves
from Hawk transgressors by showing feelings of guilt at the point of
apology. Because the transgression has occurred, those feelings of
guilt are accompanied by remorse. 58 Transgressors often also feel
shameful because their admitted blameworthy wrongdoing is further
exposed for negative evaluation by the victim and, often, others.
These emotions-guilt, remorse and shame-signal to the victim that
despite the harmful act, the transgressor is a default cooperator. Fa-
cial expression, eye contact, voice, skin color, and other facets of an
apologetic gesture serve as signals of the transgressor's emotions. 59
Because undetected insincere apologies can have enormous stra-
tegic value, biologists would predict a co-evolutionary arms race be-
tween insincere transgressors' ability to deceive victims with
apologetic gestures and victims' ability to detect transgressor insincer-
ity.6° The arms race theory helps to explain why the nuances of apol-
5& See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1814-15(1999) ("1 can feel guilty about a moral transgression I intend to commit-which may indeed
stop me from doing it-but I will feel repentance or remorse (as well as guilt) only when the
deed is done." (emphasis in original)); 1. Thalberg, Remorse, 72 MIND 545,546 (1963) ("We can
feel guilty about intending to take a double portion of strawberries, but nobody ever feels re-
morse for his unexecuted designs." (emphasis in original)). When a victim scrutinizes an apol-
ogy for sincerity, she is in part looking for signs of remorse; see also Enright & Kittle, supra note
44, at 1630:
Asking for or receiving forgiveness also is a moral act, not a self-serving act to reduce
one's own sentence or receive some advantage. Advantage may come, but this should
not be the primary motivation.... Perhaps a key to genuine acts of seeking forgiveness
concern remorse. How genuinely remorseful does the offender seem to be? Does the
person apologize? Does the apology seem sincere? Does the victim think it is sincere?
59. See FRANK, supra note 35, at 120-31 (describing telltale physiological signs of a variety
of emotions).
60. Robert Trivers, Deceit and Self-Deception: The Relationship Between Communication
and Consciousness, in MAN AND BEAST REVISITED 175, 176 (Michael H. Robinson & Lionel
Tiger eds., 1991).
20041
HeinOnline  -- 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1069 2004
CHICA GO-KENT LA V REVIEW
ogy are so important to victims' decisions to forgive. The more these
nuances are outside of the conscious control of the transgressor, the
more likely the apology is accompanied by a credible signal of sincer-
ity.61 Forgiving victims who can discern sincere from insincere apolo-
gies have an advantage over both uniformly generous and stingy
forgivers. The discerning forgiver can minimize the ex post costs of
moralistic aggression while simultaneously maintaining the deterrent
value of potential retaliation.
This apology discussion thus far has assumed that only the victim
has an interest in the apology. Third parties have an interest in the
apology too, however, because others who are aware of the transgres-
sion must decide whether they themselves want to risk future interac-
tions with the transgressor. The general reputational value of an
apology is recognized in the apology literature by scholars who iden-
tify apology as a way to repair one's social identity and to deflect
negative personality judgments. 62 To the extent that they do not
themselves need to interact with the transgressor, however, we can
expect third parties to scrutinize the sincerity of the apology less care-
fully. Put differently, third parties can be expected to carefully scruti-
nize the sincerity of an apology only when they expect to bear the
costs of incorrectly judging the transgressor's remorse.
Choosing not to retaliate and believing that the transgressor will
refrain from future transgressions are very different, and yet both
victims and third parties can conflate the two. Nevertheless, a trans-
gressor can sincerely feel guilt, shame, and remorse for the past trans-
gression despite the fact that his promise to forbear from future
transgressions lacks credibility. Some transgressors are incapable of
taking appropriate care to prevent harms. Others are consumed with
emotions (such as anger) or drives (such as addiction) that will rou-
tinely overcome their preventive feelings of guilt.
Moreover, a transgressor can resolve to do better in the future,
and can sincerely believe that he is capable of mending his ways, but
self-deception simply prevents him from seeing that future transgres-
sions are inevitable. Robert Trivers, an influential evolutionary biolo-
gist, posited that the best way to deceive others may be to deceive
oneself first. In other words, self-deception may have evolved as a
61. See FRANK, supra note 35, at 126 (discussing interpretational clues to sincerity).
62. See Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children's Reactions to Mitigating Accounts:
Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1994); Bernard Weiner
et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281 (1991).
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mechanism to circumvent detection of deception.63 Evidence of self-
deception was detected in experiments using galvanic skin response.
Apparently, galvanic skin response rises when one hears one's own
recorded voice. Subjects were asked to answer questions and their
responses were recorded and later played back. When the tapes were
replayed to the subjects, they tended to deny hearing their own voice
when an incorrect response was given on the tape and claimed to hear
their own voice when correct responses were given. Even though sub-jects misidentified the voice they heard in both contexts, their gal-
vanic skin responses indicated that their bodies did correctly react to
the speakers' voices.61 The suggestion, from this experiment and oth-
ers, is that individuals are quite capable of simultaneously holding
two contradictory beliefs about themselves, so long as one is held
consciously and the other subconsciously. According to the tempo-
rary filter theory of self-deception, self-deception is an evolved cogni-
tive strategy that enables an individual to automatically but
temporarily filter out true beliefs from one's consciousness or aware-
ness within any situation calling for the deception of others.6 5
In any event, at least with first transgressions, victims and third
parties tend to see the apology as a commitment device for refraining
in the future. However, multiple transgressions are more likely to
cause the victim and third parties to separate the transgressor's re-
morse for past transgressions from his promise to refrain from future
transgressions. The next subsection explores situations where victims
too readily believe the transgressor's sincerity or the credibility of his
commitment to refrain from future transgressions.
C. When Victims Forgive Too Easily
The apology game, as played in real life, involves uncertainty. As
victims, we assess apologies for sincerity, but often we cannot know
for sure whether another's apology is genuine or strategic. We tend to
follow our "gut instinct" about whether to forgive, but rarely do we
actually forget the transgression. In the context of many ongoing rela-
tionships, then, the victim can judge over time (1) whether it was ap-
propriate to forgive the transgressor, and (2) whether it was wise to
resume her relationship with the transgressor. Repeat transgressions
63. ROBERTTRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 415-t6 (1985).
64. d. at 416-18.
65. Zubair Moomal & Stephanus Petrus Henzi, The Evolutionary Psychology of Deception
and Self-Deception, 30 S. AFR. J. PSYCHOL. 45, 46 (2000).
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often indicate that reconciliation of the relationship was unwarranted.
As indicated above, it may be that the apology was sincere, but the
transgressor is unable to refrain from transgressing. Alternatively, the
apology may have been strategically uttered. In any event, repeat
transgressions do significantly affect the interpretation of apologies.
In a study of how children respond to apology, for example, an apol-
ogy by an offender with a good reputation was interpreted as an ex-
pression of regret. When the offender's reputation was bad, however,
the apology was viewed as a way to manipulate the situation.66
Although the victim's judgment might well be fallible, presuma-
bly the victim is typically better able to judge the sincerity of an apol-
ogy than are third parties. Cognitive neuroscientists are discovering
that the level of neural activity that we devote to tasks is directly pro-
portional to the reward to be earned for successfully completing that
task.6 7 In many cases, the victim alone directly suffers the conse-
quences of misinterpreting an apology. In general, then, we might
expect the victim to be better focused on the nuances of an apology
than are third parties. Moreover, to the extent that the transgressor
and the circumstances of the transgression are more familiar to the
victim than to third parties, the victim may be better situated to inter-
pret the appropriateness of those nuances. This assertion requires a
significant caveat, however, because the subjective interpretation of
an apology can involve emotional as well as cognitive factors. Unfor-
tunately, those emotional factors can blind a victim.
The point requires elaboration. In general, the thicker the rela-
tionship between victim and transgressor, the more accurate the in-
terpretation of the apology and the assessment of the likelihood and
cost of future transgressions. For example, a wife knows a husband's
personality and behavior much better than a stranger's. She therefore
is better able to interpret both his spoken gestures and his shrugs,
slouches, touches, and blushes. She knows whether his genuine re-
morse is likely to be expressed with few words or many, and whether
his apologies are frequent or rare. Because she does not forget his
transgressions, the previous ones can be called to mind in assessing
whether his remorse is likely to lead to behavioral reform.
66. Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions: Effects
of the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353 (1989).
67. PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF
NEUROECONOMICS (2003).
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In contrast, the habits of casual friends and acquaintances may
be less intimately known to a victim. Ironically, however, the victim
might be better able to objectively assess those apologies. In the latter
case, the victim's perceived need for the continuation of the relation-
ship is lower, and, therefore, the victim is less likely to mediate herjudgments by some sense of a need to forgive. No doubt we can all
recall at least one event in our lives when we felt strong feelings of
relief when a lover or close friend offered an explanation or apology
for a perceived wrong. So desperate are we to reconcile with our
loved ones that we often fail, perhaps refuse, to carefully scrutinize
the explanation or apology. Put more succinctly, the benefits of for-
giveness rise, all else equal, as the perceived value of the future of the
relationship rises.
1. Domestic Violence
A somewhat similar (though perhaps more blinding) phenome-
non seems to occur in spousal and girlfriend abuse cases." After beat-
ing their victims, these men often proffer elaborate apologies in an
attempt to resume their relationships.69 Some victims forgive their
abusers and return to their relationships despite several very severe
prior beatings.70 In fact, more than forty percent of women who seek
aid at spouse abuse shelters return to live with their abusers.7 These
women are often confident that the beatings will stop. Sometimes
they go so far as to blame themselves or some external source of
stress for these beatings, and victims often minimize or deny the ex-
tent of the violence that they suffer.
68. The problem is significant. An estimated 1.8 million women are beaten by their hus-bands annually, and an estimated 1500 women die each year as a direct consequence of spousal
abuse. Caryl E. Rusbult & John M. Martz, Remaining in an Abusive Relationship: An Invest-
ment Model Analysis of Nonvoluntary Dependence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
558, 558 (1995).
69. The honeymoon phase of this cycle of violence typically involves contrition, promises
not to abuse again, exemplary behavior and poignant romantic gestures. LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN 65-66 (1979).
70. Kathleen O'Connell Corcoran & James C. Melamcd. From Coercion to Empowerment:
Spousal Abuse and Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 303, 307 (1990); Ann W. Yellott, Mediation and
Domestic Violence: A Call for Collaboration, 8 MEDIATION Q. 39,43 (1990).
71. Rusbult & Martz, supra note 68, at 559.
72. See Alexandria Zylstra, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening
Method for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 253, 255-56("When the abuser is a person the victim trusts, often professing love, comfort, or reassurance,
the result is a dissociated coercion. To make sense of this dichotomy, the victims may psycho-
logically minimize the violence, or believe they are to blame." (citations omitted)); Corcoran &
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Domestic violence victims are a diverse group,73 and generalizing
about their behaviors would be both difficult and unwise. Neverthe-
less, studies of abuse victims' decisions to return to their abusers
74
indicate that, all else equal, victims are more likely to return when
they perceive that they have no decent alternatives. Moreover, they
are more likely to return when they have made relatively significant
investments in their relationships. Thus, those who had married their
abusers and had children with the abusers were more likely to return
to the relationships.75 In these cases, the relative benefit to remaining
in the relationship is perceived to be great, not because the relation-
ship itself has a high positive value but rather because the alternative
to continuing the relationship seems catastrophic. Her judgment
might be based on a clear cost-benefit calculation, but often a careful
calculation is foreclosed by a strong emotional sense of commitment
76
to her relationship. One study of spouse abuse victims concluded that:
[q]uite apart from feelings of satisfaction, issues related to an
individual's broader interdependence with a partner-issues of the
degree to which an individual is committed to her relationship, hav-
ing invested in it heavily and possessing only poor-quality alterna-
tives-are importantly predictive of the decision to remain in or
exit from a relationship. 77
This sense of commitment may have its own evolutionary value.
Commitment in general helps to signal to potential mates and trading
Melamed, supra note 70, at 305 ("Chronically abused women repeatedly forgive their partners,
accept the blame, and believe, if they just try harder, their relationship will work out.").
73. Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 153-54
(2003).
74. See Richard J. Gelles, Abused Wives: IVty Do They Stay?, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
659 (1976); Joyce McCarl Nielsen et al., Social Isolation and Wife Abuse: A Research Report, in
INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 49 (E.C. Viano ed., 1992); Douglas
K. Snyder & Lisa A. Fruchtman, Differential Patterns of Wife Abuse: A Data-Based Typology,
49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 878 (1981); Michael J. Strube & Linda S. Barbour,
The Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship: Economic Dependence and Psychological
Commitment, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 785 (1983); Michael J. Strube & Linda S. Barbour,
Factors Related to the Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship, 46.J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 837
(1984).
75. Rusbult & Martz, supra note 68, at 567 (study of domestic abuse victims finding that
"commitment was stronger among women with greater investments in their relationships-
among those who were married, had been involved for longer periods, and had children with
their partners").
76. As a psychological term, commitment refers to an individual's intention to maintain a
relationship, feel psychologically attached to it, and sustain a long-term orientation to it regard-
less of the satisfaction that the individual derives from the relationship. Id. at 559.
77. Id. at 569.
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partners that a person will not take advantage of the relationship.78
Short-term goals can become subordinated to long-term interests by a
predisposition to be committed to one's relationships. For females,
commitment, or a refusal to think about other pair-bonding options,
serves the further evolutionary purpose of reassuring their mates of
their paternity of their children. The more certain a male is that his
offspring are his, the more he is willing to invest in the child as well as
the pair-bonding relationship with the mother. Commitment often
turns out to be horribly maladaptive in the context of spousal abuse,
however. In any event, this emotional commitment to the relationship
seems to have the effect of mediating victims' judgments regarding
both the sincerity of their abusers' apologies and the credibility of
their promises to stop.
Moreover, the male spouse abuser uses a number of techniques
in order to establish power and control over the actions and even
thoughts of his wife. 79 His efforts may be the result of mate-guarding
instincts taken too far."o Two prominent evolutionary psychologists,
Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, provide support for this hypothesis:
When asked to identify the primary issues around which violent in-
cidents occurred, both beaten wives and their assailants nominate
"jealousy" above all else. Battered women often maintain that theirhusbands are not only violently jealous about their interactions
with other men, but that they are so controlling as to curtail even
the wives' contacts with female friends and family.8
Alternatively, a male abuser may simply abuse in order to estab-
lish a hierarchy in the marital relationship that allows him to take
greater liberties with his wife than would be permitted in an egalitar-
ian relationship. In either event, if an abuser can cause his wife to
78. FRANK, supra note 35 (positing emotions as mechanisms for human commitment to
forgo short-term self-interests).
79. See Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 70, at 305 ("Abusers may want to control how
the victim dresses, wears her hair, keeps house, fixes meals, whom she communicates with, what
she says, and where she goes.").
80. Mate guarding is a primarily male activity, and women are ten times more likely to be
abused by an intimate partner than are men. Moreover, women who are in their prime repro-ductive years-aged nineteen to twenty-nine-are more likely to be abused than are other
women. Ver Steegh, supra note 73, at 149 (citing various ABA and Bureau of Justice sources).Although some of this age effect can be explained by the fact that younger women are morelikely to be married to younger men, the most violent group in society, the age of the wife is abetter predictor of victimization than is the age of her husband. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson,Family Violence: An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 77, 117(2000).
81. Daly & Wilson, supra note 80, at 108.
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think like a subordinate in a hierarchical relationship, then she is
likely more willing to accept a proffered apology.
Apology in the context of hierarchies works differently from
apologies in more egalitarian relationships. In a hierarchical relation-
ship, subordinates typically are expected to offer apologies for their
transgressions. The subordinate is expected to act on behalf of and at
the pleasure of the dominant, and the apology works to restore the
subordinate to the status of loyal agent. Apologies from dominant to
subordinate, by contrast, are likely more rare.
Studies of nonhuman primate conflict resolution indicate that the
willingness of dominants to initiate conflict resolution depends on the
rigidity and importance of the dominance hierarchy. In Stumptail
monkeys, which are strongly hierarchical, 94 percent of the observed
reconciliation rituals involve subordinate reconciliation behavior by
the subordinate. 2 In two-thirds of the reconciliation encounters, the
subordinate initiates the conciliatory ritual.8 3 In contrast, Bonobos,
which are in many ways behaviorally closest to humans, typically rec-
oncile by dominant initiation, and dominants typically start the con-
flict.84 Chimpanzees, which are socially less hierarchical than the
Stumptails but more hierarchical than humans, reconciled fifty per-
cent of the time by dominant initiative and fifty percent by subordi-
nate initiative. Interestingly, however, conflicts that involved
potential threats to the dominant's status never resulted in dominant-
initiated reconciliation." One implication from evolutionary biology
may therefore be that the more hierarchical the human setting, the
greater the proportion of subordinate to dominant apologizing.
Much more important than the relative frequency of dominant
and subordinate apologies for spouse abuse is the fact that apologies
appear to be used much more often in hierarchical settings than in
egalitarian ones. For example, Letitia Hickson's cross-cultural study
of apology found that apology seems to be a more predominant dis-
pute-resolution mechanism in hierarchical societies.8 6 This greater
frequency makes sense once we begin to see the extent to which
apologies are used to reinforce the fact of hierarchy. While the subor-
82. FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 163-65 (1989).
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id. at 220.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Letitia Hickson, The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-
Cultural Study, 25 EFrtINOLOGY 283, 285-87 (1986).
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dinate uses apology to reestablish the dominant's favor," the domi-
nant uses apology in lieu of other compensation. Put differently, sub-
ordinates typically are not in a position to refuse an apology or
demand further recompense. To the extent that a spouse abuser can
place his victim in the mindset of a subordinate, he can eliminate any
glimmer of serious thought about his victim's refusing to forgive. At
the same time, he can threaten to withhold his own forgiveness when
he is displeased with her behavior. He has used his power to success-
fully instill in his victim the belief that there is a dichotomy in their
payoff structures regarding the acceptance of apologies.
In the spouse abuse context, then, it seems that a generic emo-
tional commitment, coupled by a subjective belief in the lack of desir-
able alternatives, can cause a woman to return to an abusive
relationship. From the perspective of genetic adaptiveness, this strong
homeostatic force can swamp the perhaps more rational inclination to
avoid a potentially physically and emotionally painful situation. This
tendency to return will be magnified when the victim comes to see
herself as a subordinate to her husband in a hierarchical relationship.
2. Medical Malpractice
The negligent doctor context is similar to spouse abuse in that
there is some evidence that victims too easily accept apology, and, I
will argue, the causes of this excessive tendency to forgive may also
have evolutionary roots. Before moving to that evolutionary analysis,
however, some background information on physician negligence,
medical malpractice claims, and doctor apologies may be helpful.
Empirical data on the relationship between malpractice claims
and negligence reveals that there is apparently very little connection
between a physician's negligence and malpractice suits. In a Harvard
medical malpractice study, more than 31,000 New York State hospital
discharges were scrutinized for evidence of adverse events, or injuries
due to medical handling as opposed to the patient's underlying illness
or other medical problem.8 Where there was evidence of a possible
87. Cf. Orenstein. supra note 16, at 252 ("Dominance feminism would recognize that
apologies may be a style of coping for subordinate groups-weaker groups who are acculturated
to apologize, to curry favor, to ensure safety, and to reinforce the hierarchy.").
88. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Dueto Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 111, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245(1991); cj Eric J. Thomas et al., Icidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in
Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 263 (2000) (defining adverse event as "an injury caused
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adverse event, 9 physicians reviewed the medical records to determine
whether in fact the patient suffered from a medical event and, if so,
whether the adverse event identified was caused by negligence. In this
study, as well as another, approximately one percent of hospital stays
were found to involve adverse events caused by negligent medical
care.9" The team found that the chance that an injury caused by medi-
cal malpractice resulted in a malpractice claim was 1.53 percent. 91
Especially given that only half of these claimants can actually be
expected to eventually receive compensation for their injuries,92 mal-
practice claims provide only an extremely crude method of ensuring
the quality of health care. 93
At the same time that only a tiny fraction of negligence cases are
resulting in claims, the vast majority of medical malpractice claims
that are brought do not seem to expert physicians to actually involve
negligent medical care. A study of 46 closed medical malpractice
cases filed in New York State concluded that only 9, fewer than 20
percent, of the cases brought actually involved negligence.9 4 Of the 37
cases deemed not to involve negligence, 16 of them, nearly half, nev-
ertheless resulted in a settlement for the plaintiff.95
The litigation system is by no means a perfect sifter of meritori-
ous claims, and in every area of the civil common law defendants
have some incentive to offer legally undeserving plaintiffs at least a
modest settlement in order to avoid the costs of a lawsuit. In the area
of medical malpractice, however, the relationship between negligent
harm and legal outcome seems much more dramatically skewed than
by medical management (rather than the disease process) that resulted in either a prolonged
hospital stay or disability at discharge").
89. "'injuries that either prolonged hospitalization or led to disabilities that continued after
discharge were deemed to be adverse events." Localio et al., supra note 88, at 245.
90. Id. at 246; see David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming
Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 253 (2000).
91. Localio et al., supra note 88, at 247; Studdert et al., supra note 90, at 254-55 (describing
study of Colorado and Utah hospital discharges indicating that probability that a negative ad-
verse event would lead to malpractice claim was 2.5 percent).
92. Localio et al., supra note 88, at 249. A follow up study of the claims identified in the
Harvard Medical Practice Study found that of the nine medical malpractice cases deemed meri-
torious by the physician reviewers, only five resulted in any payment to the plaintiff. Troyen A.
Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of' Medical-
Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996).
93. Localio et al., supra note 88, at 249.
94. Brennan et al., supra note 92, at 1964; see also Studdert et al., supra note 90, at 253 (of
eighteen patients who filed medical malpractice claims, only four were deemed meritorious by
the reviewing doctors).
95. Brennan et al., supra note 92, at 1963, 1964.
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in other areas, and the cause of this skewing has baffled physicians.96
One thing is certain, however. Traditional settlement theory does not
explain the skew.97
One study found that the best predictor of a medical malpractice
suit was bedside manner.98 When patients feel that they have been
treated poorly by their doctors, they blame their doctors for adverse
health outcomes. 9 When they feel that they are treated well, they
tend to overlook or minimize the adequacy of their care.00 One very
powerful way to have a patient feel that he or she is being treated well
is to offer an apology for a negative medical outcome. Notice too how
the skewing of medical malpractice claims might be explained in part
by apology. If doctors are prone to apologize when they cause
harm, 1 1 then meritorious claims tend to drop out of the pool. Because
doctors tend not to apologize when they are not at fault for a patient's
suffering, more suffering patients who have not been victimized by
negligence feel mistreated, leading to a selection effect in litigation
biasing cases toward nonmeritorious claims.
Without rigorous empirical testing, we cannot know for sure
whether doctor apologies exacerbate the skew. Nevertheless, there is
some anecdotal evidence as well as theoretical support for the notion
that doctor apologies might be particularly effective at preventing
medical malpractice litigation. As one doctor recently stated in a pri-
vate conversation, "luckily for us, most patients will accept an apol-
ogy, but it matters a lot how you give it. If you apologize in the
hospital or in your office, you've got it made. It's really important to
96. Localio et al., supra note 88, at 249 (exploring possible explanations for failure of
negligently injured patients to file claims); Brennan et al., supra note 92, at 1967 (suggesting that
medical malpractice might be a disguised form of no-fault compensation for the permanently
disabled).
97. In other words, it cannot be the case that the clearly meritorious claims are just settling
quickly, because the claims data in these studies were gathered from insurers. Initiation of
formal litigation was not necessary to meet the definition of a claim, and claim payment to the
plaintiff did not require actual litigation. See Studdert et al., supra note 90, at 252 (explaining
claims identification in both New York and Utah/Colorado studies).
98. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Doctor-Patient Relationships, in SUING FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 50 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993) (study of nearly 200 Florida medical mal-
practice claims indicated that physician communication with patient is most significant factor in
decision to file claim).
99. Frank A. Sloan, Policy Implications, in SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra
note 98, at 211, 217 ("[Q]uite frequently the physician's attitude, especially in the face of an
adverse outcome, was a major factor in precipitating a suit.").
100. See id. at 218 ("[ljmproved communication, especially in the face of an adverse out-
come, should be a high priority if claims are to be avoided.").
10l. My colleague Ellen Clayton teaches her medical students about the importance and
practical significance of apologizing to patients who are harmed from the doctor's mistreatment.
2(H)4
HeinOnline  -- 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1079 2004
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
have the white coat on and a stethoscope around your neck, though.
If you go in there dressed as any Joe, it won't work." Assuming that
this anecdote accurately characterizes the circumstances in which an
apology will be effective, an evolutionary analysis of apology can help
to explain why the trappings of the apology might matter so much.
Three somewhat related phenomena merge in the case of physi-
cian apology. First is the fact that physicians as caretakers invoke a
sense of dependency and of trust. 102 We know very little about the
precise era in which any particular psychological predisposition might
have evolved. Nevertheless, it is likely reasonable to assume that in
the relevant EEA there were no physicians, because occupational
specialization is believed to have appeared later in human history.103 If
this supposition is correct, then sick individuals instead were forced to
rely on the beneficence of nonspecialized caretakers for health assis-
tance, and those caretakers were typically family members. Family
relationships are thick-trust relationships typically characterized by
the sense of commitment discussed above in the context of spouse
abuse. To the extent that a caretaker was not a family member, a sick
person no doubt felt fortunate to have the care and was therefore
unlikely to question its adequacy. Put differently, the costs of failing
to trust the caretaker were likely high relative to the costs of excessive
trust because, unlike modern times, the sick individual did not have
other caretakers to contract with. If so, the caregiver/patient relation-
ship was likely more easily restored with a caregiver apology than
were other relationships. To the extent that the white coat, stetho-
scope, positive bedside manner, and medical services environment
help to evoke the image of doctor as caretaker, the presence of these
factors might well encourage patients toward forgiveness in the face
of apology.
Second, trust in the physician can have a powerful placebo effect
on patients. Mark Hall describes the therapeutic benefits of trust:
There is very strong evidence .. that the effectiveness of care
depends on patients' confidence in its efficacy.... [Tihe doctor
himself is a placebo or a therapeutic agent, regardless of the par-
102 See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust. 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 477 (2002) ("Trust
is a defining aspect of strong caregiver relationships, one that gives them fundamental meaning
and value.").
103. RUBIN, supra note 21, at 19 ("Apparently, there was relatively little division of labor
other than by gender in evolutionary times.").
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ticular technique used or its independent, biochemical effective-
ness.
104
Perhaps the positive feeling that a patient obtains from placing
trust and confidence in the doctor helps to encourage the patient to
restore his relationship with his caregiver, even in the face of negli-
gence. If so, the trappings of the doctor status can work to facilitate
acceptance of apologies.
Third, to encourage trust in our caregivers, doctors' social status
is elevated. Doctors often exacerbate their dominant positions with
their practice behaviors. They tend to wear ties and jackets, keep pa-
tients waiting, and generally act in an authoritarian manner toward
the medical staff. They also force patients into trusting and submis-
sive positions by directing them to disrobe, perhaps at times to a
greater extent than is technically necessary. Like the therapeutic
techniques of having people lean backwards into the arms of their co-
workers, disrobing for examinations forces the patients to trust their
doctors early and often. These techniques are no doubt successful. In
fact, I can think of no other relationship in which one party develops
a thick, intimate trust of another with little interpersonal interaction.
Given the placebo effect of trust in one's doctor, these status-
elevating techniques probably benefit most patients. To the extent
that they create a sense of hierarchical submission in the patient,
however, they can further exacerbate excessive forgiveness by pa-
tients.
Statistics regarding the types of patients who file malpractice
claims suggest that there may be some rational limits to these pres-
ently irrational forgiveness phenomena. Although claiming rates
seem low for all groups of negligently injured patients, poor and eld-
erly individuals and those who suffered only minor disabilities are less
likely to sue than are others.105 Notice that, given damages measure-
ments, these groups are less likely to garner a lucrative settlement
from filing a claim. The data taken together suggest that while there
are troubling muting effects from doctor apology, at some point the
financial benefits to suit can grow large enough to make claim filing
worthwhile.
No doubt, excessive patient trust in their doctors might well pro-
duce more social gain than harm overall. The question remains, how-
104. Hall, supra note 102, at 479-80.
105. Studdert et al., supra note 90, at 257 (patients older than 75 are significantly less likely
to file despite having a meritorious claim).
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ever, whether the negative effects of excessive patient forgiveness can
be tempered without diminishing the trust that patients have in their
doctors. The next Part turns to a discussion of that question.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF EXCESSIVE PATIENT FORGIVENESS FOR
ENCOURAGING PHYSICIAN CARE
The previous Part asserted that there were important similarities
between the effects of apologies proffered by spouse abusers and neg-
ligent doctors. In the case of spouse abuse, society has responded in at
least three ways to try to temper the negative effects of victim for-
giveness. First, the criminal law has stepped in to displace the victim's
preferences. In some states, for example, the aggressor in a domestic
dispute is subject to mandatory arrest. Moreover, in all states, the
prosecutor rather than the victim decides whether to prosecute.
16
Victim cooperation is often necessary to a successful prosecution, but
placing the prosecutorial decision with the State aids deterrence by
making the threat of prosecution seem more real.
Second, most communities have safe houses, or domestic vio-
lence shelters, that exist independently of and in addition to other
social service agencies,"°7 so that victims can more effectively escape
their abusers. In many cities, lawyers volunteer their services to assist
victims in obtaining restraining orders and divorces. The strongest
domestic violence programs focus on job training and providing vic-
tims with reliable means of transportation. This assistance helps to
counteract the victim's perception that the barriers to leaving her
relationship are insurmountable.
Third, most mediation centers refuse to mediate criminal domes-
tic violence cases and, in some places, civil divorce cases that involve
domestic violence. Centers justify their refusal by citing the power
imbalance between husband and wife where domestic violence was
present, but the evolutionary analysis suggests a complementary rea-
son for declining to mediate. Mediation is typically designed to han-
dle those cases that are more appropriately handled by informal
conciliation rather than via the formal litigation process. Domestic
violence victims as a group are excessively inclined to respond to in-
formal conciliation efforts in ways that are detrimental to their own
106. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of In-
formal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57,85 (1984) (discussing prosecu-
torial policy in Anchorage, Alaska to deny abused women's rcquests to dismiss charges).
107. Id. at 81.
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well-being. In short, domestic violence victims as a group are apt to
forgive their abusers much too easily. In these cases, the formal ad-
versarial litigation system might better serve the victims' needs. 108
Nevertheless, the evolutionary analysis suggests that private liti-
gation alone is unlikely to adequately address both abused victims'
and injured patients' harms. Mediation is problematic because it
works to further encourage victim forgiveness, but most victims for-
give their doctors or spouses long before a formal civil dispute ever
forms. In these cases, denying mediation is not sufficient.
Despite this similarity, spouse abuse and medical malpractice
cases do differ significantly. First, and most obviously, spouse abuse is
an intentional harm while medical malpractice involves accidental
harms. The potential for overdeterring doctors in the care of their
patients is therefore likely much greater than the potential for over-
deterrence in the context of spouse abuse.'09 Put differently, institut-
ing criminal sanctions for negligent medical care might cause talented
people to avoid the practice of medicine, whereas criminalizing
spouse abuse is unlikely to have any deleterious effect on marriage
rates. Consequently, stronger deterrent measures can be used to
counter excessive domestic violence forgiveness than can be used to
counter excessive patient forgiveness. Unlike spouse abuse, medical
malpractice is therefore not appropriately addressed via criminal law.
Much more subtle counteractive measures need to be utilized.
Moreover, spouse abusers are likely to repeat their abusive be-
havior if the victim resumes her relationship, whereas doctors can
generally be counted on to attempt to remedy or at least minimize the
effects of the harms that they negligently inflict. While there are real
108. See Kelly Rowe, Comment, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Whv Do-
mestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855 (1985) (arguing against use
of mediation in cases of domestic violence); Lerman, supra note 106 (arguing that mediation of
abuse cases is generally problematic and should not be resorted to except in places where law
enforcement is hopelessly ineffective); Laurel Wheeler, Mandatory Family Mediation and Do-
mestic Violence, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 559, 572 (2002) ("Where there is a history of domestic vio-
lence, cases simply should not be mediated."). In the context of divorce, however, there is
significant disagreement over whether formal litigation or mediation is likely to better serve theinterests of the victim in marriages involving domestic violence. Litigation can increase hostili-
ties, and fleeing women are often unrepresented by lawyers and disadvantaged in custody de-
terminations. Zylstra, supra note 72, at 259-60. For other arguments favoring mediation indivorce cases involving domestic violence, see Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 70. at 311-12;
Yellott, supra note 70, at 42-46; see also Ver Steegh, supra note 73 (domestic violence victims
should be given opportunity to make informed choice about preferred divorce process). Indivorce cases, presumably there is less risk that the intimate relationship will resume.
109. Cf. Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REv. 741 (1993) (criminal
punishment of negligent mens rea can overdeter socially useful behavior).
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systemic concerns that result from the failure of medical malpractice
liability to deter patient harms, the case for affirmative intervention
into any specific doctor-patient relationship seems considerably weak.
The law's response to the problem of patient overforgiveness is more
likely to be indirect and regulatory in nature.
In the medical care context, the weaknesses of the liability sys-
tem can be overcome with supplemental methods for monitoring the
quality of doctor care. Two such monitoring mechanisms already in
place are hospital peer review boards"' and state licensing boards.
Hospital peer-review boards are composed of physicians on the hos-
pital's medical staff, and they review the qualifications and profes-
sional behavior of the medical staff doctors. The boards also
determine whether physicians are qualified to practice at the hospital
and they specify the procedures and treatments that each physician is
qualified to perform."' State licensing boards determine which doc-
tors are qualified to practice medicine in general."12 However, because
state licensing boards are much further removed from the daily prac-
tice of doctors, "peer review has become widely accepted as the pri-
mary means to weed out low quality [licensed] physicians.""13
A physician's peers possess the expertise necessary to review the
quality of the care that she renders,"l4 but there are two reasons to
worry about the reliability of their determinations. First, there is the
possibility that hospitals, and their physicians, will cover up medical
errors. "Absent egregious circumstances, there is no incentive for an
individual medical staff peer reviewer to challenge the conduct of a
colleague because, one day, the peer-review shoe may be on the other
foot. '" Moreover, both the physician's peers and her affiliated hospi-
110. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (formerly the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals), the effective gatekeeper of essential hospital
accreditation, requires that the doctors themselves oversee the medical staff. James F.
Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Review, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
7, 10-11 (1988); see also Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No
Benefit- Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7,13 (1999) (Joint Commission requires
hospitals to perform peer review as prerequisite to accreditation).
Ill. Scheutzow, supra note 110, at 7, 12.
112. Randall G. Holcombe, Eliminating Scope of Practice and Licensing Laws to Improve
Health Care, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 240-41 (2003). However, there is no additional certifi-
cation required to practice in specialty fields. John J. Smith, The Specialty Boards and Antitrust.
A Legal Perspective, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 195, 195 (1993).
113. Scheutzow, supra note 110, at 15.
114. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 110, at 12.
115. Id. at 15; see also Gerald B. Hickson et al., Liability, in SUING FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, supra note 98, at 92, 93 (stating that doctors are reluctant to publicly criticize
other doctors' work, especially when they know the doctor whose work is under review).
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tals may benefit financially from her future referrals, so that discipli-
nary actions can have the effect of financially harming the reviewers
and the hospital.116 In fact, although an estimated 80,000 hospital pa-
tients are killed in the United States each year as a result of medical
malpractice, fewer than 1000 adverse peer review actions are reported
to the National Practitioner Data Bank."7 These disparate figures
strongly suggest, though they cannot prove, that peer review insuffi-
ciently deters physician negligence. Finally, because peer reviewers
often have the power to destroy a doctor's career by denying or re-
voking her hospital privileges, peer review runs the risk of being used
in an anticompetitive rather than patient-regarding manner.11 8 The
problems with peer review do not seem to warrant its replacement,
but they do indicate that supplemental measures to enhance quality
of care may be warranted.
One supplemental measure would require the reporting of ad-
verse events and/or medical errors to information-gathering agencies
that could keep and publish records about individual doctors. In fact,
reporting requirements and information dissemination are already
relied on to some extent. For example, the National Practitioner Data
Bank was set up by Congress to collect information about (1) adverse
peer review determinations at hospitals and other health care organi-
zations; (2) medical malpractice payments made by insurers and self-
insured organizations; and (3) disciplinary actions taken by state li-
censing boards and professional societies.11 9 Several states require
similar reporting.12 0 However, given that medical malpractice, peer
review, and state licensing boards together likely fail to adequately
deter negligence, these monitoring shortfalls inevitably translate into
limitations on the effectiveness of this reporting requirement.
In addition to these reporting requirements, regulatory measures
could be added that either require doctors to self-report adverse
events or encourage the patients to report adverse events. In many
cases, however, only the doctor and the patient (and sometimes not
even the patient) are aware that an adverse event or error has oc-
curred. Doctors have little incentive to self-report, and patients, who
have less information, may not even know that a reporting agency
116. Scheutzowsupra note 110, at 10-1.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 110, at 15.
119. Scheutzow, supra note 110, at 36-37.
120. Id.
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exists. Even when patients know that they have suffered from an
adverse event and are aware that a reporting agency might like the
information, the problem of excessive patient forgiveness ensures that
as a group they will underreport medical problems. Underreporting
might be alleviated by requiring that the physician's staff members
report known mishaps, but then fundamental trust issues arise in the
doctor's office, and doctors may be vulnerable to disgruntled staff
members.
Moreover, to the extent that the reporting requirement is con-
ceived to serve as an information-providing mechanism, it is less than
clear that this information should be turned over to the patients. Af-
ter all, informed consumerism in this context could well eliminate the
placebo effect of retaining physician care. Put differently, patients
may be less inclined to opt for medical procedures when they are
aware of adverse events, and they might respond less favorably to the
treatment they receive if they must worry about medical errors along
the way. In short, information might help patients to avoid incompe-
tent doctors at the expense of reduced quality health across the popu-
lation.
One potentially feasible monitoring and reporting alternative
might be to require managed care organizations to gather statistical
data about adverse events and medical errors and to provide the ag-
gregate data to employers. Several states have already passed laws
requiring health plans to gather and synthesize data from individual
patient encounters into plan-level scores that can be used to make
health care coverage choices.121 To explain, managed care organiza-
tions integrate the financing and provision of health care services. 122
Managed care organizations include Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions ("HMO's"), Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPO's"), and
Independent Practice Associations ("IPA's"). Because managed care
organizations attempt to control skyrocketing health care costs,' 23
they are a popular insurance choice for employers, who organize and
subsidize more than sixty percent of the nonelderly health care cover-
age in the United States.1 24 If employers, who are becoming increas-
121. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1722-23 (1999).
122. Dionne Koller Fine, Physician Liability and Managed Care: A Philosophical Perspec-
tive, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 647 (2003).
123. See Sage, supra note 121, at 1713 ("1Hjealth care spending rose from 5.1% to 13.5% of
GDP between 1960 and 1997.").
124. Id. at 1740.
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ingly savvy about choosing among coverage options, are given infor-
mation about aggregate adverse events and/or medical error rates for
doctors participating in each managed care organization, then com-
petitive pressures might cause the managed care organizations to bet-
ter monitor the quality of care provided by each doctor. Employers
have already begun to move in this direction on behalf of their em-
ployees:
[P]rivate employers and employer-organized purchasing coopera-
tives have taken the lead in obtaining detailed disclosure from
health plans and providers, even without legal mandates, and con-
veying it to beneficiaries. Many employers use disclosed informa-
tion to select health plans for their workforce. Some corporationsgive employees formal explanations of the reasons for their choices;
others make extensive information available to beneficiaries in
addition to processing it internally. 125
Granted the proposed undertaking would be more extensive, and
might require regulatory intervention, but it seems that many em-
ployers would use the information to advantage their employees.
These reporting requirements might help to discipline the deci-
sions of the managed care organizations as well as to improve the care
of the physicians themselves. It is widely believed that managed care
attempts to control health care costs in part by limiting their physi-
cians' provision of medical services'26 and by requiring primary care
physicians to perform procedures traditionally reserved for special-
ists. 127 The reporting requirement therefore could help to counterbal-
ance managed care's incentives to provide too little or poor quality
medical health care. With a reporting requirement, employers could
receive more reliable information about whether they save money
today by increasing the rate of poor health outcomes down the road.
This reporting proposal has several limitations, however. First,
employers might not serve as reliable agents for their employees.
While they may internalize some of the costs of the adverse health
care of their employees, some of those costs will no doubt be exter-
nalized as employers struggle to make financial ends meet.2 ' Perhaps
this limitation can be overcome by making the statistical information
available to the general public, but once again we face the potential
125. Id. at 1738.
126. Fine, supra note 122, at 647.
127. Sage, supra note 121, at 1750-51.
128. Id. at 1743 (expressing concern that group purchasers, including employers, prefer to
minimize costs and residual risks rather than to maximize the quality of patient care).
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that consumer information hinders rather than aids aggregate health
outcomes. Unfortunately, this is an empirical question for which we
have no real answers. Consumer information challenges extend be-
yond those of patient trust, however. An additional problem stems
from the fact that patients are notoriously poor at comprehending
even relatively simple health information. 129 The problem becomes
worse for the elderly and those relatively untutored in American lan-
guage and culture. 30 On the other hand, consumer ignorance prob-
lems alone create very little actual harm. The worst possible outcome
resulting from consumer ignorance is that the vast bulk of consumers
might simply ignore the disclosed information. The very potential for
consumer reaction to published information can incentivize health
care providers, however. For example, current state requirements
that hospitals and surgeons disclose mortality rates do not seem to
significantly promote public awareness of the problems, and yet their
very disclosure has pressured many programs to improve their health
care services. 31 In any event, there would be some genuine concerns
about (1) whether employers or patients are the preferred recipients
of medical data, and (2) whether either would use the data in a man-
ner that would improve health outcomes.
Second, effective reporting requirements could impose a signifi-
cant and perhaps unrealistic burden on the managed care organiza-
tions. The usefulness of comparative data requires that it be carefully
and completely gathered. Some providers would be required to
gather detailed information about the individual patients of thou-
sands of doctors who practice under the plan. 32 In the extreme, very
onerous reporting requirements could threaten to erode the competi-
tive advantage of managed care organizations, assuming that reliable
reporting is even feasible.
Third, the publication of adverse event statistics, if not handled
carefully, risks perverse decision making about high-risk specialties
within health care organizations. High-risk specialties, by definition,
lead to higher rates of adverse events even when doctors take due
care. To the extent that specialists in some fields would inevitably
report higher mortality rates, health care providers have an incentive
129. Id. at 1728-29.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1798-99.
132. See id. at 1723 (discussing feasibility constraints on detailed medical reporting require-
ments).
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to minimize their affiliation with these specialists.133 Unfortunately,
this suboptimal number of specialists in the network can result in
long-term costs to some insured individuals that they are unaware of
when choosing their insurance plans. Perhaps this problem can be
alleviated by devising a way to separate these services out for sepa-
rate reporting-but that can add to the costs of publishing the infor-
mation.
The foregoing analysis indicates that some reporting require-
ments can themselves create negative health outcomes to the extent
that they have negative effects on patients' trust in their doctors.
Nevertheless, carefully crafted reporting requirements imposed on
managed care organizations could, at least in theory, help offset the
reduced incentives for quality care that come from patient overaccep-
tance of apologies. I leave to health care experts a determination
about the practical feasibility of the proposal as well as the extent to
which reporting requirements should substitute for other legal, policy,
and professional mechanisms for ensuring the adequacy of legal care.
CONCLUSION
As apology advocates have previously emphasized, much of the
civil litigation that clogs court dockets in America today could be
avoided with a simple heartfelt apology. Although sometimes difficult
to offer, these expressions of remorse are profoundly powerful and
valuable for humans as social animals. Nevertheless, apologies can be
problematic. This Article used evolutionary theory as a tool to ex-
plore the costs of apology in two areas-spouse abuse and medical
malpractice-to suggest that excessive victim forgiveness can, in some
contexts, cast doubt on the effectiveness of a purely private litigation
system for creating appropriate behavioral incentives. It also explored
ways in which regulatory measures and criminal law can help to
alleviate the distortion that apologetic behavior can create.
133. Cf. id. at 1741-42 (discussing pressures created by current reporting requirements on
public and teaching hospitals which have higher mortality rates due to the fact that they take on
sicker patients).
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